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Situation awareness and capacity in coalitions
Abstract—In this paper, we propose a discussion on formal
notions situation awareness and capacity in a coalition. ..... ... We
show the connection of a state-based logical model and an action-
based logical model. The first model, named Interpreted systems
is based on epsitimic logic notions and has been identified as a
candidate for the formalisation of the situation analysis problem.
The second model, named situation calculus, is a first-order logic
of actions better suits to the formalisation of planning problems.
We give here the definitions of both notions of (1) situation
awareness and (2) capacity. The benefit of the connection between
both models is twofold: First, it allows to introduce epistemic
notions in capacities since most of the time an agent is capable of
some action only if it knows its competences. Situation awareness
can thus be seen as a condition to be met in order to validate
a capacity of action. Seconldy, we can model the effect of the
capacities of agents on their mental states, and the knowledge
of capacities like “Agent i knows that it is able to . . . , or “The
group of agents G does not know that it can do . . . ”. We thus
define the notion of knowledge-based capacity.
Keywords: Situation awareness, capacity, ability, coali-
tions, interpreted systems, situation calculus.
I. INTRODUCTION
• Higher-level information tasks like situation analysis re-
quire more logical-based appraoches [Kokar, Steinberg,
Nous, Lambert,...]
• SA and planning task are difficultly dissociable
•
• Origin of coalitions
• Distinction with other teams: The adversary. The coali-
tion is formed not only to bring together heterogeneous
comptences, but also to beat another team or group.
• Even if we consider the static case of a coalition, a
coalition is dynamic by nature.




A. Formalisms for coalition problems
• General problems: Formation, communication, coordina-
tion, cooperation
• A coalition is a set of cooperative agents in multi-agent
systems.
• Research areas: Economy (game theory), sciences poli-
tiques (social choice theory), computer science (multi-
agent systems and logical AI), military (information
fusion...)
• Game theory: Notion of equilibria, formation of coali-
tions (members selection), communication (net)
• Central concepts: Commitment, cooperation, openning,
competence, ability (Distinction between ability and ca-
pacity?) - Naturally modeled in an action-based formal-
ism since closed to the planning task, necessary informa-
tion to plan the mission, decide the coalition formation,
the assets to be committed, etc.
• Related theories: Moore (knowledge and action), Cohen
and Levesque (Intention), Rao and Georgeff (Bratman,
BDI models), Singh, Werner, Wooldridge (multi-agent)
[?], ??? (action logics like situation calculus), Fagin-
Halpern-Moses-Vardi (epistemic logics)
Approach: Computer-science-based
B. Cooperation and coalition logics
Coalition logics allow to represent and reason about con-
cepts such as ability, cooperation, commitment, goal, mis-
sion, plan, strategy, power, effectiveness . . . In these logics ,
knowlegde representation is not well developed even if some
attempts have been recently put forward [Wooldridge, ...].




Cooperation Knowledge Context Observations
ATL [1] ×
ATEL [2] × ×
NATL [3] × ×
ATOL [4] × ×
CL [5] ×
IS [?] × × ×
TABLE I
COALITION LOGICS.
In the last ten years, different logical formalisms have been
proposed to deal with coalitions. Between 1997 and 2002,
Alur, Henzinger, and Kupferman developed the Alternating-
time Temporal Logic (ATL) [1], a logic of cooperative ability,
allowing to express properties such as “Coalition C has the
capability to bring about φ”, formally denoted by 〈〈C〉〉φ. ATL
is indeed based on the temporal logic Computation Tree Logic
(CTL) in which the path quantifiers A (on all paths) and E
(on some path) are replaced by cooperation modalities 〈〈C〉〉φ
meaning that “the group G can cooperate to ensure that φ”
(or “the group G has a common strategy to force φ”) [?].
ATL has been extended with knowledge modalities by van
der Hoek and Wooldridge leading to Alternating-time Tempo-
ral Epistemic Logic (ATEL) [2]. In ATEL, some properties like
“Coalition C can cooperate to bring about φ iff it is common
knowledge in C that ψ”.
In 2002, Pauly proposed a coalition logic [5] for reasoning
about effectivity in game frames, and allowing expressions
such as “Coalition C is effective for φ”, where effective means
that the coalition can guarantee that a given subset of states
can be reach.
In 2005, ATL has been extended to account for constraints
on the actions, thus introducing the notion of context [3]. The
resulting logic is called Normative ATL (NATL), a logic of
normative ability. In NATL, obligations and permissions can
be introduced and the ability of the coalition takes then into
account these constraints.
In [6], Goranko compares coalition logics of Pauly and
alternating-time temporal logics of Alur et al. and comes
to show that coalition game logics can be embedded into
alternating-time temporal logics.
In 2006, Alternating-time Temporal Observational Logic
(ATOL) has been proposed as an extension of ATL, designed
to capture strategic properties of agents under incomplete
information [4].
C. Information fusion standpoint
• SAW in coalitions implies notions of group knowlegde, of
common understanding, constrained by an adversary, by
a specific goal to reach, by cooperability constraints, un-
certainty constraint (perception, reliability of sources...)
• SAW better model based state-based languages, like IS as
proposed in [7]. This kind of model allows to explicitely
represent situations, the environment, the uncertainty,
• Specific problem: how to conciliate both model (action-
based and state-based)?
• Benefit sought: Define goals in terms of sets of states to
reach, these states being possibly epistemic states like
situation awareness is, thus validate formulas such as
“Would agents of group G reach common awareness of
φ before time t?”
• Alternative: (1) Introduce knowledge and uncertainty
notions in SC [Bacchus etal, Scherl...] (2) Frame the
action-based logic of situation calculus in a general
state-based model like IS designed around knowledge
representations, and extended to encompass quantified
uncertainty concepts and game theory...
• Proposal: Follow way (2)! Already followed by
Wooldridge that led to ATL and its friends!
The aim of this paper is thus to first present both languages
of situation calculus and interpreted systems and draw the
equivalences and disjunctions.
See modular interpreted systems in [8], also [9], or [2], [10],
[11] for coalition epistemic logic.
III. COALITION AS A DISTRIBUTED SYSTEM
A. Interpreted systems
The interpreted systems language [12] is based on a rela-
tional semantics and provides a formal general framework for
analyzing distributed systems through epistemic properties. In
the following, we will use this language to formally represent
and discuss the different types of vagueness through different
mathematical models.
1) Background: Let us consider a set of agents A =
{1, 2, 3, . . . , n, e} where e is a special agent denoting the
environment. Each agent is assumed to be in some local state
li at a given time, encapsulating all the information the agent
has access to. le denotes the local of the environment.
A global state s is an element of S ⊆ L1 × . . .×Ln ×Le,
where Li is the set of the possible local states of the agent i.
The local state of Agent i corresponds to the ith component of
the global state s = (l1, . . . , ln, le). A sequence of global states
s1, s2, . . . is called a run r over S and is a function from time
to global states. A system R is a set of runs. (r,m) denotes a
point inR, consisting of a run r and a time m. r(m) represents
the state of the system at time m. If r(m) = (l1, . . . ln, le) is
the global state at point (r,m), then we define re(m) = le and
ri(m) = li for i = 1, . . . , n to be respectively the environment
local state and the agents local states at point (r,m). A round
m in run r is defined to take place between time m − 1 and
time m.
Actions are the cause of changes in the system, and per-
formed by the agents and the environment. Let ACTi be the
set of actions that can be performed by agent i, and let ACTe
be the set of actions performed by the environment. A joint
action is an element of ACTe × ACT1 × . . . × ACTn, i. e.
a tuple (ae,a1, . . . ,an) of actions performed by the set of
agents and the environment, where ae is the action performed
by the environment, and ai is the action performed by the
agent i.
A protocol Pi for agent i is a mapping from the set Li of
local states of the agent i to nonempty sets of actions in ACTi.
A protocol Pe for the environment e is a mapping from the
set Le of local states of the environment to nonempty sets of
actions in ACTe. Note that a protocol is a function on local
states rather than on global states. A joint protocol P is a
tuple (P1, P2, . . . , Pn) consisting of the protocols of each of
the agents i, i = 1, . . . , n. Note that Pe, the protocol of the
environment, is not included in the joint protocol. Rather, the
protocol of the environment is supposed to be given and P
and Pe can be viewed as the strategies of opposing players.
A context γ is a tuple (Pe, S0, τ,Ψ) where Pe is a protocol
for the environment, S0 is a nonempty subset of S describing
the state of the system at the initiation of the protocol, τ is a
transition function and Ψ is an admissibility condition on runs.
τ is a transition function, which for each global state and each
join action assigns the resulting global state of performing the
join action. τ also describes which actions can be performed
for a given global state. The admissibility condition Ψ on runs
tells us which ones are “acceptable”. Formally, Ψ is a set of
runs and r ∈ Ψ if and only if r satisfies the condition Ψ.
Note that the description of the behavior of a system is
contextual, i. e. , a joint protocol P is always described within
a given context γ.
Let Φ be a set of primitive propositions, describing basic
facts about the system. Formulas are built using the classical
operators of propositional logic. The set of formulas is closed
off the operators ¬ and ∧ (negation and conjunction). Hence,
given two formulas φ and ψ, ¬φ, φ∧ψ, etc are also formulas.
Let denote by L(Φ) the language of Φ, i. e. the set of well-
formed formulas.
An interpreted system I consists of a pair 〈R, π〉 whereR is
a system over a set S of global states and π is an interpretation
for the propositions in Φ over S, which assigns truth values to
the primitive propositions at the global states. Thus, for every
p ∈ Φ and state s ∈ S, we have π(s)(p) ∈ {0; 1}1.
2) Knowledge and time: Blablabla
(I, r,m)  p iff π(r,m)(p) = 1
(I, r,m)  φ ∧ ψ iff (I, r,m)  φ and (I, r,m)  ψ
(I, r,m)  ¬φ iff (I, r,m)  φ
(I, r,m)  Kiφ iff (I, r′,m′)  φ for all (r′,m′)
such that (r,m) ∼i (r′,m′)
(I, r,m) ©φ iff (I, r,m + 1)  φ
(I, r,m)  φUψ iff ∃m′ ≥ m
such that (I, r,m′)  ψ and ∀m′′
such that m ≤ m′′ ≤ m′.(I, r,m′′)  φ
where ∼i is an equivalence relation for agent i over the set of
points of the system.
Add a discussion on complexity issues [13], [14].
See complexity of model checking temporal epistemic prop-
erties (van der Meyden).
3) Introducing uncertainty: Although this feature will not
be detailed in this paper, we mention that the interpreted
systems semantics can be extended to deal with uncertainty.
In [15], the authors introduce probabilities on runs and thus
define probabilistic systems. The probability measure can also
be replaced by any other plausibility measure in the sense of
[16] like belief measure, possibility measure, rank function, to
name a few.
Add a discussion on complexity issues.
B. Mission
A protocol Pi can be seen as the strategy allowing agent i
to achieve the mission M. In general, it is possible to define
a behavioral protocol which is a non-deterministic strategy to
achieve the mission.
La mission M peut eˆtre vu comme une suite de buts ou
e´tats globaux du syste`mes ordonne´s de manie`re plus ou moins
rigide. Ainsi la mission M peut eˆtre identifie´e a` un sous-
ensemble de runs r, qui si mate´rialise´ fera en sorte que la
mission soit re´alise´ ou du moins potentiellement re´alisable.
On analyse ou conc¸oit donc le syste`me distribue´ de fac¸on a`
mate´rialiser, identifier, etc le sous-ensemble d’e´tats globaux
correspondants aux objectifs de la mission de la coalition.
Rajouter def de mission! La mission est une sorte de cahier
des charges.
10 states for False and 1 states for True.
C. Situation awareness in coalitions
1) Existing decision support concepts: - Definition - Exam-
ple of COP, RAP, CTP... - Notions of coalition formation more
of less dynamic linked to situation awareness. Pour l’instant,
juste des display, mais rien pour raisonner.... d’ou necessite
de truc! - Elements traites (track, positions,...) Introduire les
notations...
2) Formalising situation awareness:
D. Ability in coalitions
Two ways of considering the ability notion:
1) Explicit modelisation (Formal definition either in SC or
in IS), either related to action, either to protocol, or
to state. (Make the link with know-how = competence,
which can be encoded in the local state, or not)
2) Implicit modelisation (Describing the mission and com-
pared to the joint protocol, and check the model)
IV. A SITUATION CALCULUS FOR COALITIONS
A. Notions to be modelized
In our model, the mission is represented by a sequence of
actions to be performed by the group of agents. In this case, a
group succeeds in realizing a mission if it is able to perform
the complex action which describes the mission.
The primitive notion on which ability is build is the notion
of competence described as follows: competence represents
the knowing-how of the agents relatively to an action. This
knowledge may be inborn or may result from a learning phase.
In our model, this information is considered as primitive. It
must be noticed that this notion of competence is different
from the one Cohen and Levesque consider in [17], where, if
an agent competent for a proposition p believes p, then p is
true.
From the notion of competence, we first define the notion
of theoretical ability as follows:
Definition 4.1: Let A be a non empty set of agents (possibly
a singleton), and a be a primitive action. A is theoretically able
to perform a if:
1) A is competent to perform a
2) some conditions related to the agents of A are true
The conditions expressed in point 2 concern the agent (its
physical state for instance, but not all the environment).
The notion of ability is finally defined as follows:
Definition 4.2: Let A be a non empty set of agents (possibly
a singleton), and a be a primitive action. A is able to perform
a if:
1) A is theoretically able to perform a
2) a is possible
B. A model of ability in the Situation Calculus
We suggest to use the Situation Calculus for two reasons:
• firstly, this formalism is a good candidate for modelling
actions since it offers means to explicitly express precon-
ditions and effects of actions;
• secondly, an important problem underlying this present
work, the frame problem (i.e, how to express what are
the changings induced by the performance of an action
by an agent and how to express what remains unchanged),
has been provided a solution in the Situation Calculus by
Reiter.
1) The language: We consider a first order language LCS
which will allow us to model and reason about actions and
ability. In this language, the changes of the world are resulting
from action performances. It is defined as follows:
• a set of constants to represent agents.
• a set of functions and constants used to represent primi-
tive actions, with parameters or without.
• a unary predicate primitive(.) used to list the primitive
actions.
• a binary function ; used to represent the sequence of
actions.
• a constant S0 used to represent the initial situation.
• a ternary function do. Here, unlike the “classical” Sit-
uation Calculus, the agent is not a parameter of the
function which represents the action, but is a parameter
of the function do which represents the performance of
the action.
• a set of predicates called relational fluents which represent
properties which may be changed by the performance of
an action. The last argument of a fluent is a situation.
• a particular binary fluent Poss used to express that an
action is possible in a situation.
• a particular binary fluent is competent and is used to
represent the fact that an agent (or a group) is competent
for performing a primitive action.
• a particular ternary fluent is able t and is used to represent
the fact that an agent (or a group) is theoretically able to
perform an action.
• a particular ternary fluent is able and is used to represent
the fact that an agent (or a group) is able to perform an
action.
2) The axioms: First, the initial state of the world must be
represented. For doing so, for any fluent f and for any tuples
t1, . . . , tn of ground terms such that f(t1, . . . , tn) is true in
the initial situation, we consider the following axiom:
f(t1, . . . , tn, S0) (1)
In particular, since competent is a fluent, for any group G
competent for performing the primitive action α in the initial
situation S0, we consider the following axiom:
competent(G,α, S0) (2)
For any primitive action α, we consider an axiom of the
following form:
primitive(α) (3)
We represent the preconditions of the primitive actions
(i.e., the conditions that make the performance of the action
possible) by an axiom of the following type:
∀α∀S Poss(α, S) ↔ pre(α, S) (4)
We then extend this kind of axioms for a sequence α;β
where α is a primitive action and β is a complex action as
follows:
∀S∀G∀α∀β Poss(α, S)∧Poss(β, do(G,α, S)) ↔ Poss(α;β, S)
(5)
Axiom (5) expresses that α;β is possible in S iff α is
possible in S and β is possible after the performance of α
in S.
Following Reiter [?], for any fluent f(t1, . . . , tn), we con-
sider a successor state axiom which specifies all the ways the
value of the fluent may change.
∀S∀G∀α Poss(α, S) → f(t1, . . . , tn, do(G,α, S)) ↔ (6)
γ+f (t1, . . . , tn, α, S) ∨ (f(t1, . . . , tn, S) ∧
¬γ−f (t1, . . . , tn, α, S))
γ+f (t1, . . . , tn, α, S) represents the conditions which make
f true after α has been performed in S. γ−f (t1, . . . , tn, α, S)
represents the conditions which make f false after α has been
performed in S.
For any primitive action α, we consider an axiom of the
following form:
∀G∀S competent(G,α, S)∧conditions t(G,α, S) → able t(G,α, S)
(7)
It expresses that a group G is theoretically able to perform
α in situation S if G is competent for α in S and if some
conditions related to G and α are satisfied.
Finally, in order to derive the theoretical ability for a group
of agents, we consider:
∀G∀G′∀α∀S primitive(α)∧(G′ ⊆ G)∧able t(G′, α, S) → able t(G,α, S
(8)
∀G G′ α β S (G′ ⊆ G)∧able t(G′, α, S)∧able t(G, β, do(G′, α, S)) → a
(9)
Axiom (9) expresses the fact that if a sub group G′ of G
is theoretically able to perform a primitive action α, then the
group G is also theoretically able to perform α. Axiom (10)
expresses that if a sub-group G′ of G is theoretically able to
perform α and if G is theoretically able to perform β once G′
has performed α, then G is theoretically able to perform α;β
(i.e., to perform α then β).
Finally, the following axiom allows to derive the ability of
a group:
∀G∀α∀S able t(G,α, S) ∧ Poss(α, S) → able(G,α, S)
(10)
V. CONNECTING SITUATION CALCULUS AND
INTERPRETED SYSTEMS
In this part, we discuss the connection between the situation
calculus and interpreted systems. As previously discussed in
[18], situation calculus is not fundamental and the interpreted
systems framework is even richer.
A. Preliminaries
Indeed, the common basis of both language is a transition
states graph in which nodes are possible states and linked
are labelled by actions. Since situation calculus is a logic
of action, it reasons on sequences of actions (situations) and
the graph is not explicitely expressed, the states being rather
considered as transitory between actions. On the other hand,
in the interpreted systems formalism which is mainly designed
for reasoning on epistemic states, actions are only means for
changing states. These two views can be seen as dual one of
the other and in any case incompatible.
At a basis of the connection between situation calculus
and interpreted systems is the mapping between the notions
of “global state” in interpreted systems and of “situation” in
situation calculus:
s ←→ (le, l1, . . . , ln)
Situation calculus is based on a first-order logic, whereas
interpreted systems are described in a classical propositional
language. However, this simplification is only for the ease
of the exposition since as explained in [19], the interpreted
systems language can be extended to include first-order pred-
icates.
In the general case of a joint action a = [a1, . . . , an, ae]T ,
the predicate do is defined by:
do(a, s) = s′ (11)







resulting local state of achieving a from s, i ∈ A. τ describes
some prior knowledge about the world’s behavior: To each
global state, and to each action, it assigns the successor global
state:
τ(s)(a) = s′ (12)
The pre-conditions of action a can then be deduced from τ .
Indeed, if Sa is the set of all possible predecessor global states
for action a, the pre-conditions of a is represented by the
formula of corresponding to this set of states.
A y re-reflechir!!!! Voir travaux de Wooldridge et Rao et
Geogeff a propos des architectures BDI.
Table V-A summarizes the connections and differences
between both languages.
Although some trivial similarities can be drawn between SC
and IS, a major distinction between both languages requires
more caution. Indeed, contrary to IS, the distributed aspect is
Situation Calculus Interpreted Systems Notation
Set of agents Set of agents A
- Agent i
Situation Global state s
- Local state li
Initial situation Initial global state s0
Basic propositions Basic propositions Φ
do Protocol Pi
Pre- and post-conditions Transition function τ
Fluent -
- Point (r, m)
Sequence of actions Run r
- Context γ
TABLE II
COMPARISON BETWEEN SITUATION CALCULUS AND INTERPRETED
SYSTEMS.
not explicitly described in SC. In particular, when it is referred
to a group of agents, the later is not detailed neither with the
identifiers of the agents, neither with their local states, nor the
actions for which they are competent. In the following two
sections we discuss a possible extension of SC for distributed
systems, i. e. a connection from SC to IS (Section V-B) and
the coalition formation in IS, i. e. the more trivial connection
from IS to SC (Section V-C).
B. Situation calculus for distributed systems
The problem is addressed here from the standpoint of
actions. We assume that an action is a joint action by default,
and as such performed by more than a single agent. In SC,
joint actions cannot be split into more elemenary actions
whereas in IS joint actions are built from individual elementary
actions and are thus a vector of actions a = [a1, . . . , an, ae]T .
In IS the notion of joint actions has been introduced to model
concurrent actions [20]. Although concurrent actions have not
originally considered in the situation calculus, this issue has
been recently discussed in [21].
1) Different kinds of actions: In the field of action logics
and thus in SC, different kinds of actions are considered ??:
• Action composition a1; a2
• Repetition a∗
• Nondeterministic choice a1|a2
• Concurrent actions a1||a2
• Test action p?a
a) Test actions: Test actions are also called conditional
actions [22]. In ISS (interpreted systems semantics), actions
are performed according to a protocol Pi, which is defined for
each agent as a function of its current local state to a subset
of actions of ACTi, Pi : Li → 2ACTi . A protocol is then a
series a test actions of the form:
case of
if t1 do A
if t2 do B
end case
where t1 et t2 are standard tests of the form of a propositional
formula of the language L(Φ), are evaluated through the
interpretation function π. By default, A is a nondeterministic
action, i. e. a subset of ACTi.
b) Action composition: Any change in the global state of
the system results from an action execution, and thus between
two actions exists a new global state for the system. Conse-
quenlty, two different ways of modeling an action composition
exist: (1) s
a1;a2→ s′ or (2) s a1→ s′1 a2→ s′ and her are the two
corresponding protocols:
case of




if t1 do a1
if t2 do a2
end case
where t2 corresponds to the post-condition of action a1, and
the agent will performed action a2. A repetition action is
simply a special case of a composition action.
c) Nondeterministic choice: If a protocol contains a non-
deterministic choice, it is called a nondeterministic protocol.
d) Concurrent actions: Concurrent actions are intrinsi-
cally modelled in IS by the corresponding vector of joint action
a = [a1, . . . , an, ae].
2) Uractions: Let A0 = {Λ, a, b, . . . , a1, a2, . . .} be a set
of basic joint actions for the n agents, where Λ is the null
action. Two kinds of elements of A0 can be distinguished:
1) Actions a, b, . . . that can be performed by a single agent
(atomic joint actions);
2) Actions a1, a2, . . . that can only be performed by at least
2 agents (atomic joint actions).
Since in the ISS agents are the basic building blocks of the
systems, we must find a way to artificially split an atomic joint
action so that the vector a can be build. We thus introduce
the notion of uraction. An uraction is a urelement of the set
of actions2. As a urelement, a uraction is not an action by
itself but must be an element of an action. This should not
be confounded with the null action Λ. Figure 1 illustrates
the space of joint actions for three atomic actions in A0 =
{Λ, a, a1, a2}. Λ is the null action, a is an atomic joint action,
i. e. which exists only if performed by two agents, and a1 and
a2 are two atomic individual actions. In Figure 1, only 8 joint
actions are possible for the 2 agents.
To A0 is associated the set A′0 containing the uractions
corresponding to the atomic joint actions of A0. In the example
of Figure 1, A′0 = {Λ, a′, a1, a2} where a = [a′; a′]T .
3) Competence: Let A0 be a set of basic joint actions for
the n agents of a set A. We define a competence function from
A0 to P(P(A)) such that:
comp : A0 → P(P(A))
a → comp(a)
2“In set theory an urelement is something which is not a set, but may itself
be an element of a set.”
Fig. 1. Set of possible joint actions.
where comp(a) is the set of groups of agents having the
competence for executing a. Thus, that means that the group
of agents G is competent for executing the action a if and only
if G ∈ comp(a).
Then the competence fluent can be derived:
competence : P(A)×A0 → {0; 1}
(G, a) →
{
1 if G ∈ comp(a)
0 if G /∈ comp(a)
In the example of Figure 1, if no other restriction is imposed,
we have that comp(a1) = comp(a2) = {1, 2, (1, 2)} and
comp(a) = (1, 2).
4) Ability: Now we can go back to Definitions ?? and ??
of Section that can be re-stated as follows:
Definition 5.1 (Theoretical ability 2): Let A =
{1, 2, . . . , k} be a non-empty set of agents and let
a = [a1, a2, . . . , ak]T a joint action with ai ∈ A0. A
is theoretically able to perform a if:
1) A is competent to perform a, that is:
competence(A,a) = 1 (13)
2) some conditions related to the agents of A are true.
In this case, the conditions lie the current situation concerning
the agent (that it is not tired, for exemple). In IS, this property
is encoded in the state of the environment, unless the agent
has some information about its state of fatigue in which case
this will be encoded in its local state. We return to this point
in Section VI.
Definition 5.2 (Ability 2): Let A be a non-empty set of
agents, let a = [a1, a2, . . . , ak]T a joint action with ai ∈ A0
and let s be the current state of the system (i. e. the current
situation). A is able to perform a if:
1) A is theoretically able to perform a;
2) a is possible, that is:
∃s such that τ(a)(s) is defined. (14)
This definition refers to
We can even introduce another definition of ability which
takes into account the context. Indeed, something like, given
a protocol P for agent i jointly executed in a context γ, the
group of agents can be theoretically able to perform a, able
to perform a but never able to perform a since no run in the
system leads to the state s, the pre-condition of a.
C. Coalition formation in interpreted systems
Here we discuss the more trivial connection from IS to SC.
Given a set of agents, each assigned with a set of actions for
which it is competent, say ACTi. In this direction, there is no
incompatibility between SC and IS. Indeed, ...
VI. AWARENESS AND ABILITY
A. Awareness as a precondition of action
Adding a knowledge condition into the definitioin of capac-
ity.
Directly linked to knowledge-based protocols.
Example of coordinated action.
B. Capacity of knowing
Link to epistemic actions. 1. Capable of executing a.
2. [s]a = s′ and (I, r,m)  Kiφ
See security protocols. link between permission and capac-
ity.
C. Knowing capacity
Knowing that a group of agent is able to execute a.
φ = capable(G, a) and verify if (I, r,m)  KGφ
Awareness is the computationable knowledge. Agent i is
aware of φ (Aiφ) if it is capable of verifying Kiφ.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
On a tous les morceaux pour faire de la formation de
coalitions : (1) fabrication des groupes d’agents, (2) raisonner
sur les capacites et les competences. Interessant: Lies ces
notions et SAW. On est dans la situation ou on invite un
agent a rejoindre la coalition. L’agent et capable d’analyser ses
capacites et comptences mais refuser de joindre la coalition
et donc de se commettre. Donc, si un agent est capable
et comptent il peut refuser de se commettre... a joindre la
coalition. (Attention, discussion de niveau superieur) Avec les
memes notions, on peut adapter la discussion pour entrer la
dynamique dans la patente!
REFERENCES
[1] R. Alur, T. A. Henzinger, and O. Kupferman, “Alternating-time temporal
logic,” Journal of ACM, vol. 49, no. 5, pp. 672–713, 2002.
[2] W. van der Hoek and M. Wooldridge, “Cooperation, knowledge, and
time: Alternating-time temporal epistemic logic and its applications,”
Studia Logica, vol. 75, pp. 125–157, 2003.
[3] M. Wooldridge and W. van der Hoek, “On obligations and normative
ability: Towards a logical analysis of the social contract,” Journal of
Applied Logic 3 (2005), vol. 3, pp. 396–420, 2005.
[4] W. Jamroga and T. A˚gotnes, “What agents can achieve under incomplete
information,” in AAMAS’06, Hakodate, Hokkaido, Japan, May 8-12
2006.
[5] M. Pauly, “A modal logic for coalitional power in games,” Journal of
Logic and Computation, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 149–166, 2002.
[6] V. Goranko, “Coalition games and alternating temporal logics,” in
Proceedings of the 8th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality
and knowledge (TARK), 2001, pp. 259–272.
[7] P. Maupin and A.-L. Jousselme, “A general algebraic framework for
situation analysis,” in Proceedings of the 8th International Conference
on Information Fusion, Philadelphia, PA, USA, July 2005.
[8] W. Jamroga and T. A˚gotnes, “Modular interpreted systems: A pre-
liminary report,” Department of Informatics, Clausthal University of
Technology, Tech. Rep. IfI-06-15, 2006.
[9] V. Goranko and W. J. Jamroga, “Comparing semantics of logics for
multi-agent systems,” Synthese, vol. 139, no. 2, pp. 241–280, 2004.
[10] W. van der Hoek and M. Wooldridge, “Model checking knowledge and
time,” in Proceedings of the 9th International SPIN Workshop - Model
Checking of Software, Grenoble, France, April 11-13 2002.
[11] W. van der Hoek, M. Wooldridge, and S. van Otterloo, “Model checking
knowledge and time via local propositions: Cooperative and adversarial
systems,” 2004.
[12] R. Fagin, J. Y. Halpern, Y. Moses, and M. Y. Vardi, Reasoning about
knowledge. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2003.
[13] J. Y. Halpern, R. van der Meyden, and M. Vardi, “Complete axiomati-
zations for reasoning about knowledge and time,” SIAM J. Computing,
vol. 33, no. 3, pp. 604–703, 2004.
[14] J. Y. Halpern and Y. Moses, “A guide to completeness and complexity
for modal logics of knowledge and belief,” Artificial Intelligence, vol. 54,
pp. 311–379, 1992.
[15] J. Y. Halpern and M. Tuttle, “Knowledge, probability and adversaries,”
Journal of the Association for Computing Machinery, vol. 40, no. 4, pp.
917–962, 1993.
[16] N. Friedman and J. Y. Halpern, “Plausibility measures: A user’s guide,”
in Proceedings of the Eleventh Conference on Uncertainty in AI, 1995,
pp. 175–184.
[17] P. R. Cohen and H. J. Levesque, “Intention is choice with commitment,”
Artificial intelligence, vol. 42, no. 2-3, pp. 213–261, 1990.
[18] F. Bacchus, J. Halpern, and H. Levesque, “Reasoning about noisy
sensors and effectors in the situation calculus,” Artificial Intelligence,
vol. 111, no. 1-2, pp. 171 – 208, 1999.
[19] J. Y. Halpern, Reasoning about Uncertainty. Cambridge, MA: The
MIT Press, 2003.
[20] J. Y. Halpern and R. Fagin, “Modeling knowledge and actions in
distributed systems,” Distributed computing, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 159–177,
1989.
[21] R. B. Scherl, “Reasoning about the interaction of knowledge, time
and concurrent actions in the situation calculus,” in Proceedings of the
Eighteenth International Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-
03), Acapulco, Mexico, August 9-15 2003, pp. 1091–1096.
[22] B. van Linder, W. van der Hoek, and J.-J. C. Meyer, “Tests as epistemic
updates - Pursuit of knowledge,” Institute of Information and Computing
Sciences, Utrecht University, Tech. Rep. UU-CS-1994-08, 1994.
